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The imminent pervasive adoption of vehicular communication, based on dedicated short-range technology (ETSI ITS G5 or IEEE
WAVE), 5G, or both, will foster a richer service ecosystem for vehicular applications. The appearance of new cryptography based
solutions envisaging digital identity and currency exchange are set to stem new approaches for existing and future challenges. This
paper presents a novel tolling architecture that harnesses the availability of 5G C-V2X connectivity for open road tolling using
smartphones, IOTA as the digital currency and Hyperledger Indy for identity validation. An experimental feasibility analysis is used
to validate the proposed architecture for secure, private and convenient electronic toll payment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in wireless communications and crypto
technologies are fostering the emergence of innovative so-
lutions for cooperative connected and automated mobility
(CCAM). In CCAM, the road infrastructure plays a central
role in providing collaborative awareness data to connected
and automated vehicles and other road users. Dependable
vehicular communications are a cornerstone of CCAM. For
more than ten years, research and development in this area
have produced mature technology ready to me massively
deployed, notably ETSI ITS G5 and IEEE WAVE, which
share the same physical and MAC layers, initially adapted
from IEEE 801.11. Recently, however, the emergence of the
fifth generation of cellular mobile communications (5G) and
other related cellular and device-to-device (D2D) technologies,
notably cellular Vehicle to everything (C-V2X), have raised
some doubts on which vehicular communication technology
will prevail.
On the other side, recent advances in cryptography have
also led to the appearance of new digital currencies and novel
identity paradigms, all of which will be crucial for enabling
the future of digital transactions among people, organizations
and things.
An arena where such novelty combination will have a
tremendous impact is on vehicular applications. The impend-
ing evolution of autonomous electric vehicles is expected to
stem multiple services that will enhance the passengers’ user
experience and provide better returns for providers as never
before was possible. One service that can largely benefit from
these innovations is the automatic free-flow tolling of vehicles
in licensed roads, for which existing solutions are not able
to meet stringent privacy requirements and provide real-time
operation.
Road tolling, as a method of financing the transportation
system, has long been in place all around the world. Since
neither the drivers or the road operators want vehicles to stop
or slow down to pay to use a toll road, several technologies,
collectively called Electronic Toll Collection (ETC), have been
developed in the last 25 years, ranging from RFID sticker toll
tags, to Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) and
to tolling systems based on an autonomous On Board Unit
(OBU) using Global Navigation Satellite System/Cellular Net-
work (GNSS/CN). Currently, Open Free-Flow Road Tolling
(ORT), with all-electronic toll collection, is the preferred
practice, as it is more environmentally friendly, and safer than
manual toll collection [1]. Electronic tolling is cheaper than
a staffed booth, reducing the average cost per transaction.
With electronic tolling one can also vary the amount of the
toll, implement road congestion pricing, including for high-
occupancy lanes, toll lanes that bypass congestion, and city-
wide congestion charges.
Open road tolling systems need to classify vehicles, so
different vehicles types can pay be charged different rates.
Automated vehicle identification (AVI) systems use a variety
of sensors for vehicle classification, including inductive loops
to count the number of axles and light-curtain laser profilers
to detect the shape of the vehicle, thus helping distinguishing
trucks and trailers and to measure their height.
Violation enforcement systems need to be put in place to-
gether with open road tolling to minimize unpaid tolls. To this
end, several technologies can be adopted, possibly including
physical barriers or just automatic number plate recognition
systems synchronized with the on board transponder detection.
Transaction processing, a core function of the electronic
toll collection, is responsible for charging customer accounts.
Customer accounts can be postpaid, where toll transactions
are periodically billed to the customer, or prepaid, where the
customer funds a balance in the account which is then depleted
as toll transactions occur. Depending on the country and on
the adopted payment infrastructure, it can take several days
to charge the customer account, for the case of the postpaid
micro-payments.
Traditional open free-flow road tolling systems usually
have a national or regional scope, making it cumbersome for
unregistered drivers, e.g., tourists, to pay the toll, as there
might not be toll booths with alternative payment methods.
Additionally, these systems require the installation of a de-
vice in each vehicle, complex toll gantries and a centralized
payment processing system.
This paper proposes a generic tolling architecture to over-
come some of the issues of current open free-flow road
tolling systems. The new tolling architecture, is leveraged by
the IOTA cryptocurrency, for decentralized fee-less payments,
the Hyperledger Indy, for decentralized self-sovereign identity
trust, and C-V2X for connectivity with the road side infras-
tructure. Furthermore, the proposed system does not require
specialized devices installed in vehicles. The rest of the paper
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2is organized as follows: section II provides a brief overview of
the key technologies required to build the new tolling system,
while section III presents the novel tolling architecture, which
feasibility is experimentally evaluated in section IV. Section
V presents an overview of related work in the area of secure
5G communications and, finally, section VI summarises the
contributions of the paper.
II. KEY EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
The future of open road tolling systems will be shaped
by emerging technologies such as 5G communications, new
crypto currencies and distributed ledger identity networks. In
this section a brief overview of selected technologies and their
potential impact on electronic tolling systems is provided.
Although it is possible to use ETSI ITS G5 or IEEE WAVE
communications to convey the tolling transactions between
vehicles and the road side infrastructure, the crypto tolling
architecture proposed in this paper considers the use of C-
V2X communications, mainly to allow the use of smartphones
instead of specialized devices installed in the vehicles. Notice,
however, that it is still not clear whether the smartphones’
chipsets will support C-V2X. If not, the proposed architecture
can seamlessly be adapted to work with the C-V2X on board
unit (OBU).
A. C-V2X communications
Connectivity is the touchstone of the Internet of Things
(IoT) era. The 5G promise of pervasive high bandwidth and
low-cost wireless communications suggests a bright future for
IoT, as an heterogeneous range of applications will emerge
under this umbrella. Scenarios where services are enabled by
the occurrence of direct (and automated) interactions among
“things” represent one of the most interesting opportunities for
the 5G Device-to-Device technology. Indeed, such scenarios
allow alleviating the traffic load from base stations by taking
advantage of the proximity among devices, which not only
contributes to improve parameters such as throughput, latency
and power usage, but also increases the overall capacity of the
network [2] and increases its reliability.
The 3GPP Release 14 introduced the C-V2X standard [3],
also known as LTE-V or LTE-V2X, that uses the LTE PC5
interface for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications. This
standard, designed to support both cooperative traffic safety
and efficiency applications, includes two modes of operation,
namely C-V2X mode 3 and C-V2X mode 4. In C-V2X mode
3, scheduling and interference management of V2V traffic are
assisted by eNBs via control signaling, while in C-V2X mode
4 scheduling and interference management of V2V traffic are
based on distributed algorithms implemented between UEs.
C-V2X mode 3, can thus be used for long-range network
communications (V2N), relying on the conventional mobile
network to enable a vehicle to receive cooperative perception
data originated beyond the vehicles line of sight. On the
other side, C-V2X mode 4 is used for short-range direct
communications between vehicles (V2V), between vehicles
and infrastructure (V2I), and vehicles and other road users
(V2P), such as cyclists and pedestrians. C-V2X mode 4
works independently of the cellular networks, in dedicated ITS
5.9GHz spectrum.
Considering an open road tolling system as the target
application, this paper proposes the use of C-V2X mode 4, as
it can support safety applications in the absence of coverage
from the cellular infrastructure, which might not be present in
remote areas.
Concerning the security aspects of C-V2X, the 3GPP R14
specifications [3] state that no security and privacy is applied
for the PC5 broadcast communication by setting the fields
related to group security to 0. In this way, messages exchanged
among UEs have no standard security mechanisms in place.
Application layer security is outside the scope of 3GPP, but it
is suggested that credentials should be periodically refreshed
to avoid UE tracking. Security and privacy mechanisms for C-
V2X mode 4 need to be defined by regulators and operators.
As for authentication, traditional LTE authentication mech-
anisms can be employed and enforced in C-V2X mode 3.
But, since an operator may not be present in mode 4, proper
authentication has to rely on other schemes.
B. IOTA
IOTA is a cryptocurrency that was created with a focus on
IoT to solve the problems of scalability, control centralization,
transaction fees and post-quantum security that characterizes
other cryptocurrencies employing the blockchain technology
[4]. The Tangle is its key contribution and builds on the
concept of Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) as a substitute
for blockchains.
In the Tangle every vertex is a transaction. To add a
transaction to the Tangle two other transactions must be
approved. This approval can be represented by an outgoing
edge, meaning that the outdegree of every vertex is equal to
2. The indegree is not limited, a transaction can be approved by
any number of transactions. Transactions which are currently
not approved by any others are called tips. Similarly to
blockchains, for a transaction to be appended to the Tangle,
some “proof-of-work” (PoW) must be executed, mainly to
avoid spam attacks.
C. Hyperledger Indy
The Hyperledger Indy is a distributed ledger built for
decentralized identities. It uses a blockchain as a ledger and
employs a permissioned protocol where only trusted elements
can add transactions to the ledger. The trust factor removes the
need for users to do any PoW, shortening the time required
to add a transaction. Whenever a transaction needs to be
updated, a new updated one is added to the ledger. The older
transaction, whilst still existing in the ledger, is simply ignored
in future queries.
Hyperledger Indy is mostly known for its main implementer,
the Sovrin Foundation. Sovrin is a global trust network that
provides the legal and trust foundation for self-sovereign iden-
tities (SSI) [5]. Four roles with specific scopes and permissions
are defined: Trustees, Stewards, Trust Anchors and Identity
Owners. In Hyperledger Indy any user is able to issue its own
credentials. An issued credential is stored in the user’s wallet
3and can be provided to prove certain attributes to a proof
requester, also called Verifier. Every created proof is signed
by the credential Issuer. If the Verifier trusts the Issuer then
he can also trust the created proof.
III. CRYPTO TOLLING
The proposed open road tolling architecture arises from the
opportunity to adopt a decentralized approach for identification
and payment that ensures adequate anonymity and, at the same
time, provides accountability and traceability. The modern
smartphone is established at the center of the “Pay as You
Go” architecture. This device has the required computational
power to run blockchain wallets, connectivity to communicate
via 5G D2D and a GPS to monitor its physical location and
assist in the validation of toll payments.
There are several motivations to adopt a distributed SSI
mechanism enabling devices to prove their identities directly
to each other without a central authority involved. Devices
are closer to each other during information exchange (identity
validation) making the process typically faster. Because the
data exposure is set to the minimum required to fulfill a given
function, personal data has an higher level of protection. The
information controlability is also higher because the user/de-
vice is in control of the information that it shares. Finally,
because the identity information is distributed among wallets
located in devices that can be mobile (e.g., smartphones) there
is also an higher level of portability.
The adoption of a decentralized payment approach was
driven by several factors. IOTA has ultra low fees (or no fees
at all) applicable to transactions, which is a strong enabler for
micro payment systems, such as open road tolling. Because
IOTA is a globally available cryptocurrency it can be traded
worldwide without control of central authorities/governments.
Finally, when compared to other cryptocurrencies such as
Bitcoin, IOTA transactions are confirmed much faster, thus
allowing payments to be available to the receiving party much
earlier.
Although the use case presented in this paper specifically
addresses the open road toll payment use case, the proposed
architecture and its operation can be easily generalized to other
automatic service or product payments that can work under
similar requirements.
A. Architecture
The “Pay as You Go” architecture comprehends several
stakeholders: Road Operator, Toll Gantry, Vehicle and User.
The Operator is generally the company who has the con-
cession of a given highway and charges the Vehicle’s owner
for its use. The Operator does so by employing automatic
Toll Gantries that are used to register information about
Vehicles that pass by. This information is then used to either
automatically collect payment from the Vehicles’ owners bank
account or to provide mechanisms for posterior enforcing of
voluntary or forceful charging. In both cases, images of the
vehicle are recorded for traceability. Vehicles have distinct
physical attributes (licence plate, toll class, etc.) which allow
their identification in an unambiguous way. Finally, Users
Internet
User
Road Operator
Vehicle
Toll Gantry
Coin 
Wallet 
SSI 
Wallet 
Fig. 1: “Pay as You Go” architecture.
that possess a valid driving licence are allowed to drive their
Vehicles on roads covered by Toll Gantries, whereas the driver’
smartphone is the center element for paying the toll service.
As depicted in Fig. 1, all stakeholders are interconnected. it
is assumed that the User smartphone is equipped with 5G and
communicates with the Toll Gantries using C-V2X mode 4.
The Road Operator can communicate with the Toll Gantries
via a wired/fiber backhaul connection to the Internet or, also,
via 5G.
Each of the participating entities possesses a set of unique
identifications saved in a wallet that is used to authenticate
them and prove their veracity. Besides the identity wallet,
entities will have coin wallets which are used to make and
receive IOTA payments.
B. Operation
The proposed crypto architecture relies on three key ele-
ments: 5G C-V2X mode 4 connections between the User’s
smartphone and the tolling infrastructure, Hyperledger Indy for
identity management/validation and IOTA currency to conduct
the tolling service micro payments.
In the context of this paper, it is assumed that 5G C-
V2X mode 4 communications will be seamlessly established
between the User’s smartphone and the Toll Gantries. In this
sense, the trigger mechanism for initiating a new toll payment
can be implemented in multiple ways. For example, when
the connection between devices is physically established, it
can redirect the User’s smartphone to a Web page where it
automatically gets an invite to establish a connection, in a
similar way to what is typically done by companies offering
free Wi-Fi. Another option is having an App in the mobile
phone that listens to specific “out-of-band” announcements
broadcasted by the Toll Gantries and, when such a request is
detected, the smartphone is triggered to initiate an “in-band”
connection to the Toll Gantry.
The smartphone App will perform an early check to evaluate
if there is a previous ongoing digital relationship with the Toll
Gantry in range before attempting to create a new pairwise
DID for the relation. This evaluation can be realized by
4Toll GantryUser
pwDIDug, *sigkeyug, verkeyug = NewDID()
ConnectionRequest(pwDIDug, verkeyug, nonce)
pwDIDgu, *sigkeygu, verkeygu = NewDID()
ConnectionResponse(pwDIDgu, verkeygu, nonce)
Secure Peer-to-Peer Transport
Fig. 2: Establishing a pairwise DID transport
storing in the App the relationship between known Toll Gantry
DIDs and their geographical location (as perceived in previous
interactions). In this case, when a new interaction is about to
begin, the smartphone App reads its geographical localization
from the GPS and filters the list of possible DIDs, selecting
the one that is closer (minimal localization error). Then, the
smartphone App (re)establishes the pairwise DID connection
by echoing a request and receiving a response from the Toll
Gantry.
The creation of verinyms (DIDs) associated with the iden-
tities of the User, Toll Gantry, Operator, etc. is beyond the
scope of this paper. The considered scenario assumes that the
edge wallets of the User and Toll Gantry have already been
populated with the necessary credentials generated by third
party trusted organizations or authorities that are recognized
to provide them. In this context, it is also assumed that both
parties have already created their Master Secrets allowing to
guarantee that a given credential uniquely applies to them.
1) Pairwise DID creation
If the connection is successfully re-established, then a new
exchange and validation of credentials can begin. Otherwise,
a new pairwise DID relation is required to be established
following the diagram of Fig. 2. As documented, the User
agent running in the smartphone begins by creating a DID
and associated keys and storing them in its local wallet. This
new DID will be used only in the context of the interactions
with this Toll Gantry. The impossibility of reading the signing
(private) key (sigkeyug) stored in the wallet is distinguishable
by the use of an asterisk in its notation.
Subsequently, the User agent sends a connection request
to the Toll Gantry agent encompassing the created DID,
verification key and nonce. The verification key allows the
Toll Gantry to check the authenticity of the message, i.e., that
it was sent by the User. The nonce is used by the initiating
party (in this case the User agent) to correlate the response
with the request.
Upon receiving the connection request, the Toll Gantry
Toll GantryUser
ProofRequest(tolling_charge)
tolling_charge_proof=ComposeProof(gantry_certificate, tolling_charge)
ProofResponse(tolling_charge_proof)
ProofRequest(client_id)
ProofRequest(client_id_proof)
client_id_proof=ComposeProof(citizen_id, tax_id, vehicle_id, client_id)
ValidateProof(tolling_charge_proof)
ValidateProof(client_id_proof)
Fig. 3: User and Toll Gantry identity validation
agent also creates a new DID to be used in the context of this
unique digital relationship. Afterwards, it sends an encrypted
connection response using the User’s verification key (verkey)
that encompasses the newly created DID, verification key and
the nonce originally received from the User agent. Because
messages in both directions can now be encrypted using
the verkeys of the target party, a unique secure peer-to-peer
transport is established between User and Toll Gantry.
2) Credential validation
The credentials validation phase is stemmed by the User
edge agent that sends a Tolling Charge proof request to the
Toll Gantry in order to collect verifiable proof that its attributes
meet specific criteria. In this case, the Tolling Charge requires
a name, localization and unique identifier code. All of these
credential parameters must be formally asserted by a tolling
operator. As depicted in Fig. 3, the Toll Gantry agent then
composes a proof based on the received proof request and on
the Toll Gantry certificate that is stored on its wallet.
On the opposite direction, the Toll Gantry agent sends
a Client Identification proof request requiring the User’s
name, VAT number and vehicle plate number. The exposed
information about the User is required for tax purposes when
the payment is issued (e.g., to issue an invoice), while the
information about the vehicle is used in its validation.
The direction of the vehicle passage can easily be detected
by the cameras of the enforcement system that capture its
passage.
3) Payment
After the User and Toll Gantry identities are validated,
the Toll Gantry sends the payment request to the User’s
5smartphone. This request contains the due amount, the IOTA
address to transfers IOTAs to, and a nonce for the User to
use as a reference. This bill will be sent encrypted using the
pairwise DID created by the User.
The tolling App can then use this information to proceed
with the IOTA transaction that transfers the due amount to
the designated address. If the payment with the specific nonce
and value is not received within a pre-defined period of time
in the designated address, the operator may trigger a legal
process using the information collected in the enforcement
system (license plate number, vehicle characteristics, photos,
etc.) and, if available, information obtained during identity
validation.
IV. FEASIBILITY EVALUATION
This section evaluates the feasibility of implementing the
proposed payment architecture with the constrains imposed by
its operation. For this analysis a C-V2X mode 4 line of sight
communication range of 600 meters [6] and a maximum speed
of 130 Km/h were considered. The speed corresponds to the
legal limit that covers most of the countries around the world.
The identity “handshake” between the User’s smartphone and
the Toll Gantry plus the IOTA value transaction registration
into the Tangle needs to be completed during the period in
which the smartphone is in range of the Toll Gantry, i.e.,
33.2 seconds considering a coverage of 1.2 Km (twice the
communication range).
In this evaluation, given the unavailability of 5G terminal
equipment, it was decided to use 10/100 Ethernet as the
communication technology to simulate the C-V2X mode 4
communication between User device and Toll Gantry.
In the following subsections, the setup and timing results
obtained for both Credential Validation and IOTA Payment
are presented and discussed.
A. Credential Validation
The experimental setup shown in Fig. 4a was realized to
evaluate the credential validations between User and Toll
Gantry. For this purpose a set of four APU3C4 embedded
PCs running Arch Linux was used. Each PC encompasses a
quadcore AMD Jaguar processor clocked at 1 GHz and 4 GB
of RAM memory. Two PCs were setup to run a total of four
Hyperledger Indy nodes while the other two were used as
Identity Owners, one representing the User and the other one
acting as the Toll Gantry.
The Indy node pool was setup using Docker together with
version 1.6.78 of the Hyperledger Indy. On the Identity Owner
side, the Node.js wrapper for the Indy SDK version 1.6.7 was
employed. The Toll Gantry and User interaction was simulated
with two different Node.js scripts built upon the TCP ’net’
module. A basic communication performance test with the
mentioned ’net’ module allowed to conclude that the average
round trip delay between Toll Gantry and User PC was 70 ms.
In order to assess the time required to validate the identities
of the Toll Gantry and of the User in an Hyperledger Indy
setup, following the interaction sequences depicted in Figs. 2
and 3, a set of 1000 latency measurements were conducted
for the process of establishing a pairwise DID transport plus
User and Toll Gantry identity validation.
The results of this assessment are documented in the Cumu-
lative Distribution Function (CDF) illustrated in Fig. 5. The
average elapsed time for establishing a secure channel and
validate the credentials of both parties (User and Toll Gantry)
is 1090.3 ms. In average, establishing a secure pairwise DID
connection took 119.4 ms, while the credential validation of
the Toll Gantry and User lasted 467.0 ms and 465.9 ms,
respectively.
An aspect that is worth mentioning is the latency determin-
ism in all stages of the credential validation. The steep CDF
latency curves indicate that the delays are concentrated around
average values with little dispersion around them.
B. IOTA Payment
In order to evaluate the Tangle transaction attachment la-
tency, which represents the amount of time taken to conduct
a toll payment, a test setup employing a personal computer, a
IOTA node and a “Proof-of-Work” (PoW) accelerator encom-
passing an FPGA where used. The test setup is illustrated
in Fig. 4b. The personal computer employs a i7-3630QM
CPU, operating at 3.40 GHz with 8GB RAM memory. The
IOTA node is implemented on a four-core virtual machine
running on a Xeon X5675 processor operating at 3.46 GHz
with 12GB RAM memory. This node is connected to the IOTA
network and runs IRI version 1.5.5 (IOTA’s node software)
while exposing its API through HTTP. The PoW accelerator is
a Cyclone 10 LP FPGA, named PiDiver [7], connected through
its GPIO pins to a Raspberry Pi 3B running a HTTP server.
In Fig. 4b the PiDiver plus Raspberry Pi is represented as a
single entity named PiDiver.
Using IOTA’s JavaScript library, iota.js, value transactions
(bundle of three transactions) were added to the Tangle in order
to simulate effective toll payments. This bundle includes in
one of the transactions’ message field (signatureMessageFrag-
ment) the nonce related to the toll payment request issued by
the Toll Gantry. The bundle also holds information about the
sender and receiver addresses as well as the value transferred
between the two.
The process of attaching a value transaction to the Tangle
can be divided in three stages: selection of two transactions to
be approved (tip selection), execution of the PoW (attach to
Tangle), and network broadcast of the transaction (broadcast).
The processing work related to these three stages were out-
sourced through HTTP requests by the personal computer to
the other local network elements, the IOTA node and PiDiver.
In the first stage, the tip selection algorithm is run two
times, a process which was outsourced to the IOTA node
as it requires an up-to-date ledger. In the second stage the
proof of work is computed, a process which was outsourced
to the PiDiver in order to shorten the time required to find
a nonce. The third stage corresponds to the diffusion of the
transaction in the Tangle, a process which was outsourced to
the IOTA node as it is connected to the IOTA network. The
Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF) of a 1000 iterations
of the latency experienced in these three phases is plotted in
Fig. 6.
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Fig. 4: Experimental setups used to evaluate the latency of performing credential validations with the Hyperledger Indy
framework and conducting digital money transactions through the IOTA network.
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created pairwise DIDs and both-ways authentication achieved through the exchange of on-spot created and validated proofs.
As shown, the duration of the PoW has a high variance
due to the randomness of finding a suitable nonce. The step
with the higher impact in latency is the “attach to tangle”
component corresponding to the “proof-of-work” that needs
to be carried out for each transaction. The average latency is
1.02 s in this case. The second most significant contribution is
the “tip selection”, averaging at 0.43 s. The message broadcast
averages around 0.06 s. Overall, the global latency of adding a
value transaction to the Tangle using our setup is 1.51 seconds
in average.
After a transaction is added to the Tangle, and before it can
be considered complete, it must be confirmed in the Tangle.
Although this process is carried without the involvement of the
User smartphone, it does implicate that the transaction cannot
be deemed concluded until it is confirmed. Indeed, the longer
it takes for the transaction to be confirmed the less probable
it is to be. This is where reattach and promote techniques can
be employed to foster its confirmation. This process is beyond
the scope of this paper as it can be later executed by the Road
Operator or by the Toll Gantry.
C. Discussion
Results for credential validation show that this process
takes a short amount of time and it is highly deterministic
when compared to attaching a Tangle transaction. Although
the amount of information used in the credential validation
is adequate for the envisaged purpose, it may not fit other
applications requiring more parameters in the credentials.
The results for the latency of a IOTA value transfer are,
approximately, 40% higher than those of the credential vali-
dation. To make that worse, a IOTA exchange among parties
results not in one transaction added to the Tangle, but in
multiple transactions. These transactions are grouped into a
so-called bundle that represents an atomic transfer item in the
Tangle. The “tip selection” and “broadcast” are the same as
for appending a single transaction. However, the PoW (“attach
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Fig. 6: CDF of the latency experienced during the multiple phases of issuing a value transfer to the Tangle (three signed
transactions).
to tangle”) must be carried out individually for each of the
embedded transactions in the bundle. At the recommended
level of security for low-value transactions (level 2 - 256
bit signature) three transactions will be embedded in the
bundle: debit, credit and debit signature. This number of
transactions occurs when exchanging IOTAs only between two
addresses/“accounts”: one belonging to the User and the the
other to the Toll Gantry.
The overall latency of conducting the credential validation
and performing the IOTA value exchange between User and
Toll Gantry is demonstrated to last 2.6 seconds in average for
the realized test setup. This result shows that an open road toll
collection system solely based on the proposed architecture
and operation can perform all steps within a bounded time
window of 33.2 s, thus making the solution feasible and
providing enough slack to handle higher vehicle speeds and
support reduced communication ranges, for example.
As the trials were conducted in a very controlled com-
munication environment, it is expected that common wireless
phenomenons such as multi-path fading and interference will
degrade the performance of the electronic tolling system, but
without compromising its operation.
V. RELATED WORK
Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services will benefit from the
enhanced performance of 5G systems, such as ultra-low la-
tency, higher data rates, reliability and other features such as
network slicing [8]. Moreover, high speed data rate and low
latency timings are expected to be accompanied with efficient
authentication procedures.
Legacy cellular networks provide a high level of security
to its users. Traffic is encrypted and the user equipment (UE)
and base station (BS) are mutually authenticated. However the
new networking paradigms created by 5G advanced features
require new security mechanisms. In 5G, not only the UE and
BS are authenticated mutually but the authenticity of third
party services needs to be verified [9].
Traffic is expected to be largely offloaded to D2D con-
nections between user equipment in order to decrease the
computational burden on base stations. This allows a more
efficient spectrum use but also gives rise to certain problems
such as increased interference.
New attack vectors are expected to arise due to the more
advanced services that 5G is capable of supporting. The
multitude of services supported by 5G makes it very difficult
to create a one-fits-all security architecture. Such architecture
should be capable of sustaining DDoS and man-in-the-middle
attacks, as well as jamming due to device interference and
third party eavesdropping.
Vuk Marojevic [10], discusses possible threat scenarios for
C-V2X and concludes that, despite the safety-critical nature
of C-V2X, only few mechanisms and procedures have be
specified to secure it. In fact, the 3GPP R14 specifications for
C-V2X explicitly state that no security is applied for the C-
V2X broadcast type communication, i.e., messages exchanged
among UEs have no standard security mechanisms in place.
In [11], Lu et al, present a comprehensive survey on the
security of 5G V2X services together with an in-depth analysis
of the state-of-the-art strategies for securing 5G V2X services
and discussing how to achieve trust, security, or privacy
protection in each strategy.
According to Qualcomm [12], as security over PC5 mode 4
relies on application layer security, there will be no difference
in the privacy and security for the C-V2X when compared to
IEEE 802.11p based solutions. This means that application-
level security defined in IEEE WAVE (1609.2) and ETSI
ITS G5 can be transparently used in C-V2X. Despite this
possibility, for the use case consider in this paper, that would
imply using a centralized public key infrastructure [13] and a
significant bandwidth penalty on the wireless medium [14].
Yang et al, [15], discuss the process of securing 5G wireless
communications using physical layer. Physical layers security
techniques use the characteristics of the wireless channel,
multiple antennas, modulation and coding in order to avoid
eavesdropping. These techniques have two major advantages:
8they don’t require any considerable computational complexity,
meaning that powerful unauthorized devices can’t disturb the
network security, and, they have a high scalability, avoiding the
need of a sometimes difficult to implement cryptographic key
distribution system where devices constantly join and leave
network cells.
Key management in small network cell can be difficult
where users constantly join and leave access points. The
increased latency caused by the frequent handovers between
cells can also impact the efficiency of the authentication
processes. In order to leverage the benefits of SDN, a fast
authentication method is presented in [16]. The proposed
method is considered to be hard to be compromised due to the
use of several physical layer attributes used as user fingerprints
in the authentication process. User location is also predicted
in order to prepare the next relevant cells.
In [17], 5G is a potential candidate in vehicular networks
(VANETs). A system architecture is proposed featuring real-
time video services with emphasis on reliable, secure and
privacy-aware communications. The architecture is composed
by a mobile core network (MCN), a trusted authority (TA), a
department of motor vehicles (DMV), and a law enforcement
agency (LEA). D2D and mmWave procedures are used in
the communications. The proposed cryptographic mechanisms
include a pseudonymous authentication scheme, a public key
encryption with keyword search, a ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption, and threshold schemes based on secret
sharing.
In device-to-device (D2D) communications, devices can
communicate with each other without going through base
stations. A secure data sharing protocol (SeDS) for D2D
communication in 4G LTE-Advanced is proposed in [18].
The proposed method achieves various security requirements
through the use of digital signatures and symmetric encryption
without adding extra load to the network. The proposed
method can detect free-riding attacks by keeping records of
the current user equipment in the network.
In [19] the authors propose a secret key sharing method
between two devices without the need of prior knowledge
between both of them in order to achieve secure D2D com-
munications. This is achievable through a low computational
cost and small mutual authentication overhead. The proposed
method was implemented using two smartphones and the Wi-
Fi Direct protocol, demonstrating the efficiency and usability
of the proposal.
The physical layer can also be used to secure D2D com-
munications. In [20], the authors propose the use of a beam
forming technique that uses physical layer coding to secure
information as it passes through a relay. Results show that the
algorithm converges fast and D2D performance is degraded as
the number of eavesdroppers rise.
D2D nodes in proximity can share sensitive information
relative to their users identity and personal details [21]. A
eavesdropper could exploit D2D communication weaknesses
and as therefore use the stolen information for illegal pur-
poses. Contributing to D2D security, in [22], the concept of
continuous authenticity and a security scoring system (SeS) for
measuring security is proposed. Legitimacy patterns, which are
sequence of bits inserted in the transmitted packets continu-
ously are introduced to give an advantage over the attackers.
In order to measure the security, the security scoring system is
based on the violation of the legitimacy patterns. Simulation
results show an efficient detection of attacks without requiring
intensive computations at higher layers of the software stack.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The deployment of 5G C-V2X technology will foster a
richer service ecosystem for vehicular applications. The emer-
gence of new cryptography based technologies for digital
identity and currency will stem new solutions that will meet
existing and future challenges. This paper proposes a crypto
tolling architecture that harnesses 5G C-V2X connectivity
between User and Toll Gantry devices in order to establish a
secure, private and convenient tolling system. Besides describ-
ing the architecture and operation of the envisaged solution,
the paper also documents a feasibility analysis conducted
using an experimental setup. Results show that an open road
tolling system can be realized using the IOTA framework for
payments and the Hyperledger Indy for self-sovereign identity
validation. Results also show that the use of dedicated GPU
hardware can ensure the execution of IOTA’s PoW in a timely
fashion.
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